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Abstract: 
The serial order effect—the tendency for later responses to a divergent thinking task to be better 
than earlier ones—is one of the oldest and most robust findings in modern creativity work. But 
why do ideas get better? Using new methods that afford a fine-grained look at temporal 
trajectories, we contrasted two explanations: the classic spreading activation account and a new 
account based on executive and strategic aspects of creative thought. After completing measures 
of fluid intelligence and personality, a sample of young adults (n = 133) completed a 10-min 
unusual uses task. Each response was time-stamped and then rated for creativity by three raters. 
Multilevel structural equation models estimated the trajectories of creativity and fluency across 
time and tested if intelligence moderated the effects of time. As in past work, creativity increased 
sharply with time and flattened slightly by the task's end, and fluency was highest in the task's 
first minute and then dropped sharply. Intelligence, however, moderated the serial order effect—
as intelligence increased, the serial order effect diminished. Taken together, the findings are 
more consistent with a view that emphasizes executive processes, particularly processes involved 
in the strategic retrieval and manipulation of knowledge, than the simple spreading of activation 
to increasingly remote concepts. 
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 Article:
Creativity research has many ideas, both old and new, about how people come up with new 
ideas. In the present research, we propose some new ideas about one of creativity research's 
oldest ideas: the serial order effect in idea generation ( Christensen, Guilford, & Wilson, 1957). 
One of the many landmark discoveries by Guilford and his group was that ideas tend to get 
increasingly original, novel, and remote as time passes. In a divergent thinking task, for example, 
it's more likely for the good ideas to appear later and the more mundane ideas to appear earlier. 
Guilford's idea had a huge influence on associative theories of creative thought, particularly 
theories founded on spreading activation in semantic memory ( Mednick, 1962; Wallach & 
Kogan, 1965). 
During the half-century since Guilford's work, many experiments have replicated the serial order 
effect: as time passes, creativity goes up and fluency—the number of responses—goes down ( 
Parnes, 1961; Ward, 1969). And there's apparently no debate about why this happens: all 
research explains the serial order effect with reference to low-level associative processes typical 
of semantic networks. In contrast, we propose a new explanation for the serial order effect. We 
contend that the growth of creativity across time represents the influence of top-down executive 
influences on creative thought, such as strategy use, interference management, and directed 
search and retrieval processes. The serial order effect—long viewed as a foundation for 
associative models of creativity—might instead be yet more evidence for an executive 
interpretation of divergent thinking and creative thought ( Nusbaum & Silvia, 2011a; Silvia & 
Beaty, 2012). 
The present research thus provides a new look at the serial order effect. After reviewing past 
work, we discuss some methodological limitations and show how modern methods and statistical 
models can overcome them. We then present an experiment that examined the influence of fluid 
intelligence—an ability central to executive cognitive processes ( Carroll, 1993; Conway, Kane, 
& Engle, 2003)—on the creativity and fluency of divergent thinking across time. Taken together, 
the results both illustrate new methods for studying the serial order effect and suggest 
reconsidering why it happens. 
The Serial Order Effect  
Many studies, using a variety of methods and samples, have found that later ideas tend to be 
better than early ideas. Christensen et al. (1957), in the first demonstration, gave adult 
participants a series of divergent thinking tasks (e.g., unusual uses, plot titles, impossible 
situations) and instructed them to come up with ideas that were either appropriate or clever (i.e., 
“interesting-arousing, catchy, inviting, or novel,” p. 84). Their research was inspired by the 
emerging literature on verbal fluency tasks, which had found that low-frequency words tend to 
appear later ( Bousfield & Barclay, 1950; Bousfield & Sedgewick, 1944). Each divergent 
thinking task was timed between 12 and 16 minutes, and participants were asked to draw lines 
under their last response at 2-min intervals to mark the time period. Across several studies, 
Christensen et al. found that creativity increased as time passed. This was apparent in descriptive 
curves of temporal trends and in statistical tests that compared responses during the first half of 
the task versus the second half. 
Later work replicated and extended the serial order effect. Several studies showed the effect with 
children ( Milgram & Rabkin, 1980; Phillips & Torrance, 1977; Runco, 1986; Ward, 1969); 
evaluated the effect for different kinds of tasks ( Johns, Morse, & Morse, 2001; Phillips & 
Torrance, 1977); and explored a range of scoring methods, such as subjective ratings ( Parnes, 
1961), flexibility ( Runco, 1986), and originality and uniqueness ( Runco, 1986; Ward, 1969). 
The typical methodological approach has been to offer more time than the usual divergent 
thinking task (or to have no time limit) and then to test for the serial order effect by splitting the 
scores into two groups and comparing them. 
With the benefit of hindsight and statistical advances, we can identify some methodological 
challenges that were difficult for past research to handle. The first limitation is the kind of 
within-person statistical tests that were available to past researchers. Nearly all studies did a 
within-person median split and then compared the halves. In some cases, the scores were split 
based on the task's median (e.g., after 5 minutes during a 10 minute task); in other cases, the 
scores were split at each person's own median (e.g., after the fourth response for a person who 
gave eight responses). Readers familiar with multilevel modeling will recognize this difference 
as analogous to centering within-person data at the overall sample's mean versus each person's 
own mean ( Enders & Tofighi, 2007). The perils of median splits have become more understood 
since most of the serial order research was conducted (e.g., Cohen, 1983; Maxwell & Delaney, 
1993). Among other problems, a median split puts distant responses into the same category and 
close responses into different categories. For a participant with 20 responses, for example, the 
two halves would consist of responses 1–10 and responses 11–20. Response 11 is much closer to 
10 than 10 is to 1, but 10 and 11 end up in different categories. 
A second and more subtle limitation is the data sparseness that results from variation in fluency. 
Because few people generate a lot of responses, and because responses taper off as time passes, 
few people have responses late in a task. In the serial-order curves depicted by Christensen et al. 
(1957, p. 84), for example, participants with fewer than 6, 8, or 10 responses (depending on the 
task) were excluded. The resulting curves thus fail to represent the true temporal trends in the 
sample, and the findings are probably biased by the extensive listwise deletion ( Enders, 2010). 
In Ward's (1969) research, most participants had no responses at the later time points, so some 
people were dropped from many analyses. That decision probably biased the findings in complex 
ways, given that Ward found that the more creative people in his sample were less likely to be 
dropped. 
In short, past work lacked the statistical tools needed to harness the extensive within-person data 
that divergent thinking tasks provide. This is an instance of the broader struggle that 
psychological research had within repeated-measures data prior to the development of advanced 
statistical models for nested data structures ( Singer & Willett, 2003). Modern methods for 
repeated-measures data, particularly multilevel models ( Luke, 2004; Raudenbush & Bryk, 
2002), can overcome both limitations. First, unlike repeated-measures ANOVA, multilevel 
models allow each person to have a different number of within-person scores. It is thus easy to 
handle the fact that people generate different numbers of responses. Second, multilevel models 
allow time-varying predictor scores, which means simply that people can vary in their time-of-
occurrence scores. In an ANOVA framework, the time-of-occurrence scores would have to be 
equated across people by classifying the responses into time bins, such as into above-median and 
below-median bins (e.g., Milgram & Rabkin, 1980; Parnes, 1961) or into successive 2-min or 
10-s bins (e.g., Christensen et al., 1957; Ward, 1969). In a multilevel model, in contrast, 
researchers can simply measure when responses were given and then use those time values to 
predict the responses' creativity. Researchers thus needn't drop participants with too few or too 
many responses. 
Explaining the Serial Order Effect  
The serial order effect is unusually robust, so the important question is why ideas get more 
creative across time. The most common explanation comes from the classic associative model of 
creativity pioneered by Mednick (1962). According to this view, divergent thinking is a process 
of spreading activation in semantic memory, and creative ideas come from activating and 
connecting distant concepts. This model implies a spatial metaphor of creative ideation: people 
must first pass highly related, accessible responses (e.g., table-chair) before they arrive at remote 
and unusual ones ( Moran, 2009). The Remote Associates Test (RAT; Mednick, 1962), a task 
designed to assess this conception of creative ability, remains a popular measure 50 years later ( 
Sawyer, 2011). 
Mednick's associative mechanism provides a simple and appealing explanation for temporal 
trends in divergent thinking. It takes time for increasingly remote associations to become active 
and available, so the serial order effect reflects the gradual spreading of activation from close and 
obvious associations to remote and unusual ones. With enough time, activation will spread to 
distal associates on the fringe of the network, and those are likely to be original and novel ( 
Milgram & Rabkin, 1980; Wallach & Kogan, 1965; Ward, 1969). More generally, the spreading 
of activation through semantic networks remains an influential explanation for how divergent 
thinking happens and why some people are better at it than others ( Kaufman, 2009; Runco, 
2007). Furthermore, an associative explanation reinforces the long-standing distinction between 
divergent thinking, which is broad, diffuse, and bottom-up, and convergent thinking, which is 
narrow, focused, and top-down. 
Modern creativity research, however, has suggested that the classic divergent-versus-convergent 
distinction obscures many top-down, executive, and controlled aspects of creative thought. 
Recent research, for example, has highlighted the contributions of exercising top-down control 
over attention and cognition ( Benedek, Bergner, Könen, Fink, & Neubauer, 2011; De Dreu, 
Nijstad, Bass, Wolsink, & Roskes, 2012; Fink et al., 2009; Nusbaum & Silvia, 2011a; Vartanian, 
2009; Zabelina & Robinson, 2010; Zabelina, Robinson, Council, & Bresin, 2012), judging and 
refining initial ideas ( Finke, Ward, & Smith, 1992; Gabora, 2005; Vartanian, 2011), and 
choosing and applying idea-generation strategies that vary in effectiveness ( Gilhooly, Fioratou, 
Anthony, & Wynn, 2007). The trend toward viewing divergent thinking in terms of executive 
processes suggests that researchers should take a new look at the serial order effect. Executive 
processes unfold over time, too, and we think that the temporal operation of executive processes 
provides a plausible interpretation of why responses get more creative across time. Three 
executive processes in particular seem to change in ways that would correspond with increases in 
creativity. 
First, people identify, use, and discard strategies during a divergent thinking task, and patterns of 
strategy use map on to patterns of creativity. Gilhooly et al. (2007), in a revealing set of studies, 
analyzed how people selected and changed cognitive strategies over the course of an unusual 
uses task. In the first of two experiments, participants were asked to “think aloud” as they 
worked through the task. Protocol analysis of the verbal reports ( Ericsson & Simon, 1980) 
revealed several classes of strategies that people used to come up with unusual uses. The least 
creative responses resulted from a retrieval-based strategy—simply recalling preexisting uses 
from memory—whereas creative ideas were associated with other abstract strategies (e.g., 
disassembling the object and using the parts). Regarding serial order, Gilhooly et al. found a 
temporal structure to strategy use. Around 97% of the participants started with the memory-
retrieval strategy, which generates mundane and obvious uses. Many participants never switched 
away from this strategy, but most eventually discarded it and switched to a more fertile strategy. 
As a result, strategy use over time would also create a serial order effect: responses become more 
creative as people discard poor ideation strategies in favor of better ones. 
Second, executive switching—when people stop generating ideas from one conceptual category 
and switch to another—unfolds over time. Research on verbal fluency tasks, which are close 
cousins of divergent thinking tasks ( Carroll, 1993), shows that people higher in intelligence and 
working memory span switch categories more often ( Troyer, Moscovitch, & Winocur, 1997; 
Unsworth, Spillers, & Brewer, 2011). In both verbal fluency tasks and unusual uses tasks, people 
typically start with a salient and obvious category. For a brick task, people might start with 
“construction uses” by listing uses such as build a wall, fireplace, or garden path. Once a 
category is exhausted and people hit an impasse, they need to stop the search processes within a 
category, generate a cue for a new category, and then construct responses within it. Some 
people—people lower in intelligence and working memory span—have a harder time with such 
deliberate control of attention and cognition, so they switch less often and hence have fewer 
ideas in verbal fluency tasks ( Unsworth et al., 2011) and less creative ideas in unusual uses tasks 
( Nusbaum & Silvia, 2011a, Study 1). As with strategy use, switching has a temporal structure 
that would create a serial order effect: if people first exhaust an obvious category and then stop 
and switch to new idea categories, their later responses will be better than their earlier responses. 
Third, interference management during a divergent thinking would lead to later responses being 
better than earlier ones. Creating good responses involves managing interference from obvious 
uses, previously generated responses, and responses closely connected to the object's salient 
features (e.g., a brick's color, shape, and density). Managing interference is a central executive 
process (Unsworth, 2010), and several cognitive abilities, particularly fluid intelligence and 
working memory span ( Burgess, Gray, Conway, & Braver, 2011), predict how well people can 
do it. The fan effect, for example, refers to a type of interference that stems from an 
overactivation of shared conceptual information in long-term semantic memory ( Anderson, 
1983b). People with low working memory spans experience more interference than high-spans 
during tasks where the number of shared concepts (or fans) increases ( Bunting, Conway, & 
Heitz, 2004; Cantor & Engle, 1993). Taken in the context of divergent thinking tasks, it's likely 
that the initial search for alternative uses activates highly related associates in semantic memory. 
Overcoming this source of interference and navigating beyond tightly knit conceptual knowledge 
requires executive processes and abilities associated with the control of attention. Like strategy 
use and switching, interference management has a temporal structure that would create a serial 
order effect: obvious, common ideas and object features come to mind first, so better responses 
come later when people overcome interference from obvious ideas and early responses. 
The Present Study  
The serial order effect is easy to replicate but hard to explain. The dominant explanation for the 
serial order effect is associative: responses get better as increasingly remote semantic concepts 
are activated. But executive processes unfold across time, too, and we have discussed how 
several of them unfold in ways that would generate a serial order effect. We think an executive 
explanation is at least as likely as an associative one, and the present experiment sought to gain 
evidence in support of our reinterpretation. 
A straightforward way to examine the role of executive processes is to examine the role of fluid 
intelligence, a domain-general executive ability ( Carroll, 1993). People higher in fluid 
intelligence can use complex strategies more effectively ( Nusbaum & Silvia, 2011a, Study 2), 
switch idea categories more often ( Nusbaum & Silvia, 2011a, Study 1), manage interference 
(Unsworth, 2010), and discern patterns, rules, and structure in complex problems ( McGrew, 
2005). Fluid intelligence is closely tied to working memory span ( Süß, Oberauer, Wittman, 
Wilhelm, & Schulze, 2002), another ability fundamental to the deliberate control of cognition 
and attention. Fluid intelligence can thus represent variability in how well people can exert 
control over the mental resources needed to generate good ideas. 
In our study, we measured the creativity of responses across an extended divergent thinking task. 
People had 10 minutes to generate unusual and creative uses for a brick. The software that 
controlled the task precisely recorded when each response was given, and multilevel models 
were used to estimate the trajectory of creativity across time. To examine the role of intelligence, 
we administered six standard tests of fluid intelligence, with an emphasis on nonverbal and 
visuospatial tasks. If the serial order effect reflects the unfolding of low-level spreading 
activation in semantic memory, then we wouldn't expect fluid intelligence to moderate it. But if 
the serial order effect reflects the unfolding of executive processes, then we would expect to find 
two things. First, people high in fluid intelligence should generate better, more creative responses 
overall, consistent with our claim that intelligence promotes creative thought ( Nusbaum & 
Silvia, 2011a; Silvia & Beaty, 2012). Second, fluid intelligence should moderate the serial order 
effect. Specifically, time should matter more for people low in intelligence but matter less for 
people high in intelligence. It's harder for people low in intelligence to manage interference, to 
hold a good strategy in mind while applying it, and to switch the train of thought from one track 
to another, so they are more likely to perseverate in unproductive categories and to apply easy-
but-ineffective strategies (e.g., searching memory for previously seen uses for a brick). People 
high in intelligence, in contrast, can more quickly discard unproductive strategies, switch from 
unproductive categories to fertile ones, and inhibit obvious and mundane uses that compete for 
attention. They can thus start strong and do well throughout the task instead of spending the first 
few minutes wading through and breaking free from mundane ideas. 
Method  
Participants 
The sample was comprised of 133 undergraduate students—92 women, 41 men—from the 
University of North Carolina at Greensboro. Students volunteered to participate and received 
credit toward a research option in a psychology class. Based on self-reports, the sample's racial 
and ethnic composition was diverse—European American (61%), African American (26%), 
Asian American (10%), and Hispanic/Latino (5%)—and several people (6%) selected more than 
one category. Age ranged from 18 to 48, with a mean of 19.6 ( SD = 3.2). The most common 
majors were psychology, nursing, undecided, and kinesiology. 
Procedure 
Participants completed the study in groups of 1 to 8. Upon entering the lab room, participants 
were given a consent form and a brief explanation of the study. Following informed consent, 
students completed a divergent thinking task, a series of fluid intelligence tests, and some self-
report questionnaires. The tasks and questionnaires were administered with MediaLab v2010 ( 
Empirisoft, 2010). The data were collected as part of a larger study on cognitive abilities and 
creativity. Another paper presents data on a metaphor task that was included ( Silvia & Beaty, 
2012); the creativity data have not been presented elsewhere. 
Divergent thinking task 
Participants had 10 minutes to generate unusual uses for a brick. Similar to past serial order 
research ( Christensen et al., 1957; Parnes, 1961; Runco, 1986), we gave people more time than 
usual to have a larger window to track temporal trends in creative quality. Participants typed 
each response into text fields presented on a computer screen, and the software time-stamped 
each response. 
Before starting the task, students were briefed on the characteristics of an appropriate response. 
We instructed them to “be creative” and “to come up with something clever, humorous, original, 
compelling, or interesting.” Past research demonstrates that “be creative” instructions increase 
the quality of responses ( Christensen et al., 1957; Harrington, 1975; Niu & Liu, 2009). 
Responses were scored using the subjective scoring method ( Silvia et al., 2008). Three raters 
scored each response independently on a 1 ( not at all creative) to 5 ( very creative) scale, using 
criteria of novelty, remoteness, and cleverness. Time-stamped identifiers were removed and the 
responses were sorted alphabetically prior to scoring, so raters were unaware of an item's serial 
order, the number of responses a participant provided, which response came from which 
participant, and all other information about the participants. 
Fluid intelligence tasks 
After completing the divergent thinking task, students were given a series of six fluid 
intelligence tests. We chose measures that were spatial and nonverbal to avoid superficial 
overlap with the verbal divergent thinking task. All tasks were administered electronically using 
MediaLab. Students completed the following assessments: (1) an abbreviated version of the 
Ravens Advanced Progressive Matrices (18 items, 12 minutes; see Carroll, 1993); (2) a paper 
folding task, which asks people to determine the final state of a piece of paper that has been 
folded, punched with holes, and unfolded (10 items, 3 minutes; Ekstrom, French, Harman, & 
Dermen, 1976); (3) a letter sets task, which presents a series of four-letter combinations and 
requires people to determine which set does not follow a rule governing the other four (16 items, 
4 minutes; Ekstrom et al., 1976); (4) the matrices task from the Cattell Culture Fair Intelligence 
Test (CFIT; Cattell & Cattell, 1961/2008), in which a pattern must be completed by choosing the 
missing segment of a matrix (13 items, 3 minutes); (5) the series task from the CFIT, in which a 
sequence of images must be completed by selecting the next corresponding image (13 items, 3 
minutes); and (6) a number series task, in which participants complete a sequence of numbers by 
discovering a guiding rule (15 items, 4.5 minutes; Thurstone, 1938). 
Results  
Data Reduction and Descriptive Statistics 
Each response was time stamped based on elapsed milliseconds, so we converted each value into 
decimal time. A value of 1.75 thus means that 1.75 minutes had elapsed (i.e., the 1:45 mark) 
when the response occurred. To score fluency, we segmented the task into 10 1-min blocks and 
counted the number of responses that occurred in each of the 10 blocks. 
Our analyses used multilevel structural equation modeling, an extension of conventional 
multilevel modeling that includes latent variables ( Heck & Thomas, 2009). In particular, we 
modeled creativity as a latent variable with three indicators, one for each rater (see Silvia, 
2008c). The divergent thinking ratings were highly skewed—each rater gave at least 75% of the 
responses a score of 1 or 2 on the 5-point scale. We always find skewed ratings in our research—
most responses are mundane, some are pretty good, and a few are great—but this level of skew 
required treating the ratings as ordinal variables. An ordinal model uses the distribution of scores 
in each category to estimate each person's underlying trait score, which is assumed to be 
continuous ( Skrondal & Rabe-Hesketh, 2004). The factor loadings for the three raters were 
nearly identical, so we constrained them to be equal to simplify the model. The reliability of the 
ratings was high: Cronbach's alpha, estimated from the factor loadings ( Hancock & Mueller, 
2001; Silvia, 2011), was .89. 
For our analyses, we built up from main effects to full multilevel models. At the between-person 
level, we estimated the main effect of fluid intelligence; at the within-person level, we estimated 
the main effect of time. The full models included both main effects as well as their interaction, 
known as a cross-level interaction. A significant cross-level interaction between fluid 
intelligence and time would mean that the effect of time on divergent thinking—the serial order 
effect—varies across levels of intelligence. Between-person predictors were centered at the 
sample's overall mean; within-person predictors were centered at each person's own mean ( 
Enders & Tofighi, 2007). We estimated all models using Mplus 6.1 ( Muthén & Muthén, 1998–
2010), using maximum likelihood with robust standard errors. Unless noted otherwise, all effects 
are unstandardized. 
Creativity 
We first examined the within-person main effect of time on creativity. For this model, we 
estimated the linear and quadratic effects of time on creativity, which was specified, as described 
earlier, as a latent variable indicated by the three raters' scores. Both the linear ( b = .138, SE = 
.016, p < .001) and quadratic effects ( b = −.018, SE = .004, p < .001) were significant. Figure 1 
depicts the estimated pattern. Our data showed the same trend as past work—responses became 
increasingly creative across time, but the linear trend flattened toward the end of the time period. 
 
 
Figure 1. The creativity of divergent thinking responses across time. 
Next, we examined the between-person main effect of fluid intelligence on the creativity of 
people's divergent thinking responses. Fluid intelligence was specified as a latent variable with 
six continuous indicators, one for each task. This main effect was significant, b = .174, SE = 
.077, p = .024. An estimate of the standardized effect size was β = .260. 
Finally, we examined whether time and fluid intelligence interacted. To simplify this complex 
model, we specified fluid intelligence as an observed variable by standardizing and then 
averaging the six intelligence tasks. The between-person level had fluid intelligence (centered at 
the sample's grand mean) as a predictor; the within-person level had the linear effect of time 
(centered at each person's mean) as a predictor. The full model, not surprisingly, found 
significant main effects of fluid intelligence ( b = .448, SE = .194, p = .021) and of time ( b = 
.112, SE = .012, p < .001). More notable was a significant interaction between time and fluid 
intelligence, b = −.042, SE = .015, p = .004. 
Figure 2 depicts this interaction as a scatterplot. The X-axis is fluid intelligence; the Y-axis is the 
size of the time–creativity slope. As intelligence increases, the within-person relationship 
between time and creativity becomes smaller. In short, the serial order effect diminished as 
intelligence increased. People high in fluid intelligence had flatter slopes, so the creativity of 
their responses depended less on time. Stated the other way, people low in fluid intelligence had 
steeper slopes, so their responses became increasingly creative with time.  
 
Figure 2. The interaction between fluid intelligence and time. 
Fluency 
What about fluency across the 10 minutes? On average, people came up with 13.6 responses ( 
SD = 6.6), but these responses tended to appear in the task's first few minutes. Figure 3 shows 
the average number of responses generated during each minute of the task. The pattern shows a 
burst of responses during the first two minutes and a swift decline thereafter. 
 
Figure 3. Fluency across the 10 minutes of the task. 
As with the creativity scores, we used multilevel models to examine the effects of time and 
intelligence on fluency. At the within-person level, there were significant linear ( b = −.474, SE = 
.044, p < .001) and quadratic ( b = .031, SE = .004, p < .001) effects of time, as one would expect 
based on the trend shown in Figure 3. At the between-person level, there was no main effect of 
fluid intelligence, b = −.509, SE = .773, p = .511. The estimated standardized effect size was a 
meager β = −.074. Furthermore, there was no interaction between time and fluid intelligence 
( b = .016, SE = .017, p = .359). Fluency thus behaved differently than creativity: it started high 
and swiftly dropped, and fluid intelligence didn't predict overall fluency or fluency's relationship 
with time. 1 
Discussion  
Why are later ideas more creative than earlier ideas? The serial order effect is easy to replicate: 
many researchers have found it using diverse tasks, samples, and scoring methods. The 
prevailing explanation, interestingly enough, is the oldest explanation: it takes time for people to 
reach remote associates on the fringe of a sematic network, so responses become more unique 
and creative as people move away from close, obvious concepts to remote and uncommon ones. 
The associative explanation proposed by the early researchers ( Christensen et al., 1957; 
Mednick, 1962; Parnes, 1961) was compatible with parallel work in verbal fluency ( Bousfield & 
Barclay, 1950; Bousfield & Sedgewick, 1944) and with the period's deep interest in 
associationism as a component of complex behavior and cognition (e.g., Berlyne, 1965; Hull, 
1952). 
It's an irony of history that verbal fluency tasks, an inspiration for the original work on the serial 
order effect, are now known to involve many executive processes, particularly cue generation, 
category switching, and interference management ( Troyer et al., 1997; Unsworth et al., 2011). 
Divergent thinking tasks appear to be receiving a new look, too, given the modern turn toward 
proposing executive and strategic mechanisms of creative thought (e.g., Benedek et al., 2011; 
Fink et al., 2009; Gilhooly et al., 2007; Nusbaum & Silvia, 2011a; Silvia & Beaty, in press; 
Zabelina & Robinson, 2010). Like associative processes, executive processes unfold over time in 
ways that would create a serial order effect—it takes time for most people to develop a good 
strategy, overcome interference from obvious ideas, and identify fertile idea categories. As a 
result, the serial order effect in divergent thinking—like the parallel effect in verbal fluency 
tasks—might result from the operation of top-down processes, not from simple spreading 
activation. 
To test this idea, we examined the role of fluid intelligence in serial order. Fluid intelligence is 
central to executive control, so it is a way of capturing individual differences in mental 
management: the ability to manage interference, to deploy abstract strategies, and to successfully 
direct attention and thought. Our experiment found a pronounced serial order effect, which 
replicated prior work. More interesting, however, was the significant moderating effect of fluid 
intelligence. The serial order effect diminished as intelligence increased, and it was effectively 
absent at the highest levels of intelligence in our sample (see Figure 2). Taken together, the 
findings revealed that people higher in fluid intelligence started with better ideas and did better 
throughout the task—their initial ideas were as good as their later ones. 
Because highly intelligent participants didn't show a serial order effect, it seems unlikely that the 
effect is overall solely due to spreading activation in semantic networks. We should emphasize 
that our evidence for this claim is indirect and oblique—the experiment didn't directly measure 
semantic spread, the operation of executive processes within the task, or online verbal reports of 
people's thoughts and strategies—but we nevertheless think our reasoning is sound in light of the 
findings. Specifically, the people who performed the best on the divergent thinking task showed 
no change over time, so it is clear that temporal change isn't essential to doing well. If anything, 
the long-standing spatial metaphor of moving away from close, obvious ideas toward remote, 
original ones may be misleading (cf. Moran, 2009). Good ideas needn't be “farther away” in 
semantic space than bad ideas—indeed, good ideas are often generated by people on the spot, not 
waiting to be found in the frontiers of memory ( Gilhooly et al., 2007). Instead, people who are 
more effective at managing their minds can recruit the strategies and processes needed to 
generate ideas despite interference generated from obvious ideas and entrenched ways of 
thinking. 
Past meta-analyses ( Kim, 2005, 2008) and literature reviews ( Kaufman & Plucker, 2011; Kim, 
Cramond, & VanTassel-Baska, 2010) suggest that creativity and intelligence are modestly 
related. Our main effect of fluid intelligence on divergent thinking was notably higher (β = .26) 
than the benchmark effect size from Kim's (2005) meta-analysis (around r = .17). It's worth 
pointing out, however, that our past research has shown that the relationship between intelligence 
and creativity increases when researchers analyze latent variables ( Silvia, 2008b), assess higher-
order factors of intelligence rather than lower-order abilities ( Nusbaum & Silvia, 2011a, Study 
1; Silvia, 2008a), and include several creativity tasks ( Nusbaum & Silvia, 2011a, Study 2). The 
present study thus had some strikes against it: it included only one unusually long divergent 
thinking task, and it analyzed fluid intelligence rather than the higher-order g factor. As a result, 
we suspect that this higher-than-average effect size is nevertheless an underestimate of the true 
effect size, but this is naturally a claim that awaits future work. 
As an aside, our findings for fluency nicely round out the experiment. First, fluency started high 
and then swiftly declined. This replicates prior work, albeit with a more robust method for 
estimating temporal trajectories. Second, creativity and fluency varied in their predictors. Fluid 
intelligence had both a main effect and an interactive effect for ratings of creativity, but it had no 
effects on fluency. Such dissociations have appeared in our past work, and they are one reason 
why we have advocated for subjective scoring ( Silvia et al., 2008). Traditional methods for 
scoring divergent thinking, particularly uniqueness scoring and its variants, lead to unusually 
high correlations between creativity and fluency (e.g., Hocevar, 1979; Silvia, 2008b). Subjective 
ratings, in contrast, appear to effectively divorce creative quality from mere quantity ( Silvia, 
Martin, & Nusbaum, 2009; Silvia et al., 2008). 
Executive Mechanisms in Creativity 
Given that our evidence for an executive interpretation of the serial order effect is indirect, it's 
worth developing some of the likely mechanisms. Our approach to executive aspects of creativity 
more generally presupposes that there are many entry points for cognitive control in the creative 
process ( Nusbaum & Silvia, 2011a), so one would expect a range of processes to be important. 
One critical mechanism is the ability to inhibit irrelevant information, particularly salient-but-
obvious responses and prepotent associations. Considering the associative architecture of long-
term memory, one can imagine the interference that would arise during a divergent thinking task 
from the overactivation of high-frequency associates in stored semantic knowledge (i.e., the fan 
effect; see Anderson, 1983b). To generate unusual uses, it seems likely that some level of 
associative blocking must occur to inhibit the most closely related elements of a given cue (e.g., 
a brick). Several models of selective retrieval provide insight into the inhibitory mechanisms 
involved in overriding prepotent associates that compete for activation in semantic memory (e.g., 
Anderson, 1983a; Cantor & Engle, 1993; McGeoch, 1932). Selective retrieval requires the 
deliberate suppression of salient knowledge ( Bunting, Conway, & Heitz, 2004; Friedman & 
Miyake, 2004; May, Hasher, & Kane, 1999), an ability that should be useful for generating novel 
associations during creative cognition. 
This contention received support from a study of individual differences in performance on the 
Remote Associates Task (RAT; Gupta, Jang, Mednick, & Huber, 2012), perhaps the classic 
example of a test anchored in the associative tradition. Participants were encouraged to respond 
rapidly to each problem and to guess if necessary. Using computational models, Gupta and 
colleagues demonstrated that poor performance on the RAT was characterized by a bias toward 
responding with high-frequency semantic associates of the three RAT cues. Conversely, strong 
performance was characterized by (1) overcoming high-frequency associates and instead 
considering low-frequency ones, and (2) correctly evaluating an option as correct or incorrect. 
These findings are consistent with our view that creative thinking involves managing 
interference from neighboring associates in semantic memory. 
We should note that our findings aren't consistent with an expanded spreading activation model. 
In such an account, everyone starts with obvious, prepotent ideas that spread toward remote 
ideas, but only people low in intelligence give the obvious responses. People high in intelligence, 
in contrast, inhibit the obvious responses and only begin typing their ideas once they have 
arrived at remote concepts that they feel are creative enough. Such a view thus sees spreading 
activation as the core process: everyone wades through obvious ideas, and intelligence merely 
moderates people's ability to inhibit and reject them. Although interesting, this account seems 
unlikely based on additional analyses. If smart people are simply inhibiting the same prepotent 
associates that everyone else is typing, then we would expect them to take longer to type their 
first response, assuming that the rate of semantic spread is similar across intelligence levels and 
that the process of inhibiting and rejecting ideas requires time. To test this prediction, we 
correlated Gf (the average of the six z-scored tasks) with how long it took people (in decimal 
time) to give their first idea in the brick task. The correlation between intelligence and latency 
was essentially zero ( r = −.037, p = .673), which suggests that people high in fluid intelligence 
were not simply waiting out the obvious ideas. 
But managing knowledge via the control of attention isn't the only executive contribution to the 
generation of creative ideas. Two other mechanisms—strategy use and goal maintenance—
deserve mention. Strategy use received an extensive treatment in Gilhooly et al.'s (2007) protocol 
analysis of people's verbal reports during unusual uses tasks. As we mentioned earlier, that 
research found a wide range of strategies that varied in effectiveness. People who came up with 
better ideas were able to stop the most intuitive strategy (search memory for known uses), 
identify a better one, and keep it in mind while enacting it. Goal maintenance—the ability to 
keep a task's goal in mind while performing the task—has not yet been studied in creativity 
tasks, but it is probably important. People with better cognitive control, such as people with high 
working memory spans, are less likely to have a task's goal (such as “to be creative” and 
“generate only creative uses”) slip from mind during the task ( Kane & Engle, 2003; Marcovitch, 
Boseovski, Knapp, & Kane, 2010). Maintaining a goal online during task performance requires 
stronger executive control of thought, and it seems sensible that smart people generate better 
ideas in part because they can keep the task's “be creative” goal in mind while simultaneously 
executing ideational processes. 
Integrating Top-Down and Bottom-Up Models of Creative Thought 
Throughout, we have been critical of associative models of creative thought. Our criticism of this 
tradition has been a bit exaggerated so that we could emphasize the contrast between executive 
and associative mechanisms. Nevertheless, we do agree that associative processes—even humble 
spreading activation—are important to creativity, and we suspect that the big problem for future 
work is to understand the interaction of controlled and automatic aspects of creative thought. 
Many aspects of thought are hard to control, so intentionally trying to generate creative ideas 
involves managing a set of processes that, as a group, aren't entirely manageable. 
Recent work provides several innovative examples of how executive and associative processes 
interact. First, some people probably use passive associative cueing as a strategy for idea 
generation. A humorous example comes from the verbal reports obtained by Gilhooly et al. 
(2007). Several of their participants simply repeated the name of the object to themselves (e.g., 
“brick… brick… brick”) in an attempt to spark ideas. This strategy won't often yield original 
ideas—it will yield ideas already stored in memory, not novel ones—but it does show how 
people can deliberately try to spark ideas using associative spread. 
Second, people vary in associative abilities. In one of the few studies of associative abilities and 
creativity, Benedek, Könen, and Neubauer (in press) developed a series of tasks that required 
generating words according to associative constraints. As a set, the associative abilities explained 
over half the variance in divergent thinking fluency, but two kinds of abilities emerged as 
particularly important. The first, associative combination, is the ability to generate a word that 
was associated with each word in a pair of words. The second, dissociative ability, is the ability 
to generate semantically unrelated words. These two abilities involve many features of higher-
order thought, such as discerning abstract relationships and inhibiting semantic knowledge, and 
the findings illustrate how seemingly low-level processes can recruit general mechanisms of 
cognitive control. 
Third, low-level associative processes can be viewed in terms of dynamic systems that exhibit 
features of executive processes—selection, inhibition, and goal-direction—but do so based on 
self-organizing dynamic qualities, not intentional top-down input. The best-known example is 
Gabora's (2005, 2010) honing theory, which examines self-organizing properties of low-level 
conceptual and memory systems. The conventional way of viewing semantic knowledge in 
creativity has been to focus on spreading activation (e.g., the traditional explanation for the 
serial-order effect) or on the structure of semantic knowledge (e.g., research on how prior 
knowledge states affect creativity and problem-solving; Weisberg, 2006). In honing theory, in 
contrast, knowledge systems themselves can self-organize and interact according to dynamic 
rules. The end result can appear directed, but the processes unfold based on the low-level 
system's initial state, rules, contents, and organizational tendencies. Unlike the other approaches, 
then, honing theory views associative processes as goal-directed, but the person needn't exercise 
agency or intention for them to unfold. If developed to examine how intelligence and creativity 
relate, honing theory might offer the most problematic critique of an executive approach: 
creativity's top-down appearance would be only specious. 
Some Limitations and Directions for Future Work 
The present research offered a new interpretation of the serial order effect and illustrated how 
new methods and statistical models can be used to test it, but there are several limitations that 
would serve as fruitful directions for future work. First, the experiment used fluid intelligence as 
a proxy for a family of executive abilities, but it would be worthwhile to untangle them. For 
example, measuring strategy use via think-alouds or prompts embedded in the task, assessing 
interference management directly ( Unsworth, 2010), or manipulating variables that would affect 
interference, switching, and executive capacity would shed light on the mechanisms behind our 
global effect. Second, fluid intelligence is one of several cognitive abilities within modern 
models of the structure of intelligence (e.g., Carroll, 1993). Several other abilities—such as 
crystallized intelligence (Gc) and retrieval ability (Gr)—are relevant to creativity broadly and to 
the intersection of executive and associative processes specifically. A more expansive 
assessment of cognitive abilities that incorporated innovations in assessing Gc and Gr (e.g., 
Benedek, Könen, & Neubauer, in press; Rolfhus & Ackerman, 1999) would be an important next 
step. Finally, the present work showed how new methods can be applied to studying the serial 
order effect that avoid the vexing statistical problems found in past work. The serial order effect 
is a good paradigm for studying how creative thought unfolds over time, so studying moderators 
beyond the few considered here would be productive. 
Conclusion  
The serial order effect is one of the oldest empirical findings in creativity research, and it is 
central to models of divergent thinking that presume a spread of activation toward increasingly 
remote associations (e.g., Wallach & Kogan, 1965). Nevertheless, modern research on executive 
aspects of creative thought suggests that some executive control over creativity is possible, so 
perhaps some people can arrive at good ideas without first wading through bad ones. In our 
research, the serial order effect diminished as fluid intelligence increased. Because smart people 
did better overall and generated consistently good responses throughout the task, two things are 
clear: (1) people needn't first work through poor ideas to arrive at good ones, and (2) creative 
ideas can be recruited and developed in the absence of associative spread. This work further 
supports the emerging interest in executive aspects of creative thought and suggests that the 
underpinnings of the classic serial order effect deserve a new look. 
Footnotes 
1 Although fluid intelligence is the central focus of this research, it's worth noting some effects 
of personality, given the large literature on personality and creativity. A first set of analyses 
explored between-person main effects of the Big Five Factors, measured with the 60-item NEO 
Five Factor Inventory (NEO-FFI; Costa & McCrae, 1992). Only one of them—openness to 
experience, naturally—predicted creativity. Consistent with a vast amount of work (see Feist, 
1998; Silvia, Nusbaum, Berg, Martin, & O'Connor, 2009; Nusbaum & Silvia, 2011b), people 
high in openness generated ideas that were more creative, b = 1.561, SE = .256, p < .001. None 
of the other four factors had a significant effect. Furthermore, there were no significant cross-
level interactions involving the five factors, so the effects of time on creativity were independent 
of personality. Similar effects appeared for fluency: openness to experience ( b = .261, SE = 
.110, p = .017) and neuroticism ( b = .157, SE = .079, p = .048) had main effects on fluency, but 
none of the cross-level interactions was significant. 
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